Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting

We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; (iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect the relevance in the credit market of the costs firms face in searching information and switching lenders.financial intermediation. loan rates, price discrimination, variance analysis

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; (iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect the relevance in the credit market of the costs firms face in searching information and switching lenders.financial intermediation, loan rates, price discrimination, variance analysis.

On-site inspecting zombie lending

“Zombie lending” remains a widespread practice by banks around the world. In this paper, we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections affect banks’ future lending decisions. We find that an inspected bank becomes 20% less likely to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. Overall, banks seemingly reduce zombie lending because the incentives to hold these loans disappear once they are forced to recognize losses.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Political uncertainty and the geographic allocation of credit: evidence from small businesses

We investigate how banks change the geographic distribution of their small business loan portfolio when they face political uncertainty in some of the states where they operate. Using exogenous variation in gubernatorial elections with binding term limits, we show that political uncertainty causes local banks to increase out-of-state lending to small firms, especially to firms located in the wealthiest out-of-state counties. This effect follows a decrease in lending in the local market and is stronger for banks that are more capital constrained. The increase in credit availability leads to an increase in employment growth and net firm creation in sectors that need larger amounts of startup capital. Our results indicate that geographic diversification and financial integration enable banks to sidestep the negative local economic effects of political uncertainty

How does personal bankruptcy law affect start-ups? *

Abstract We exploit state-level changes in the amount of personal wealth individuals can protect under Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy to analyze the causal effect of debtor protection on the financing structure and performance of a representative panel of U.S start-up firms. We show that a higher level of debtor protection reduces the availability of credit, employment, operating efficiency, and survival rate of firms owned by low-wealth entrepreneurs. We find no such negative effects for firms owned by high-wealth entrepreneurs, who still have large amounts of assets unprotected under the new bankruptcy regime. Our evidence actually indicates that these wealthier entrepreneurs expand their businesses by increasing employment. Our results are consistent with theories that predict that debtor-friendly bankruptcy regimes redistribute credit from the less wealthy to the more wealthy individuals. (JEL: G32, G33, K35, M13

Collateral Damaged? Priority Structure, Credit Supply, and Firm Performance

A unique legal reform in 2004 in Sweden redistributed collateral rights from banks holding floating liens to unsecured creditors without changing the value of assets on firms’ balance sheets. Using a country-wide panel of all incorporated firms, we document that a zero-sum redistribution of collateral rights and the resulting reduction in collateral capacity towards banks contracts the amount and maturity of corporate debt and leads firms to slow investment and forego growth. Altering their allocation of assets, firms reduce particularly those assets with a low collateralizable value for banks and also hoard more cash. However, the reform has no impact on corporate capital intensity or efficiency, suggesting that under these newly binding credit constraints firms simply shrink their operationspublishedVersio

How does personal bankruptcy law affect startups?

We exploit state-level changes in the amount of personal wealth individuals can protect under Chapter 7 to analyze the effect of debtor protection on the financing structure and performance of a representative panel of U.S. startups. The effect of increasing debtor protection depends on the entrepreneur's level of wealth. Firms owned by mid-wealth entrepreneurs whose assets become fully protected suffer a reduction in credit availability, employment, operating efficiency, and survival rates. We find no such negative effects for low-wealth and high-wealth owners. Our results are consistent with theories that predict that asset protection in bankruptcy leads to a redistribution of credit.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Collateral Damaged? Priority Structure, Credit Supply, and Firm Performance

A unique legal reform in 2004 in Sweden redistributed liquidation proceeds from banks holding floating liens to unsecured creditors. Using a country-wide panel of all registered firms, we document that the resulting reduction in collateral capacity contracts the amount and maturity of corporate debt and leads firms to slow investment and forego growth. Altering their allocation of assets, firms reduce particularly those assets with a low collateralizable value for banks and also hoard more cash. However, the reform has no impact on corporate capital intensity or efficiency, suggesting that under these newly binding credit constraints firms simply shrink their operations